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INTRODUCTION: DEFINING CLINICAL SCHOLARSHIP
LAWRENCE M. GROSBERG"
Even a cursory reading of the articles in this volume shows that
clinical writing is flourishing. The New York Law School Law Review has
brought together works representative of the current scholarly production
of clinicians. Only one other law review issue comes to mind as a
compilation of a similar body of writing.' The papers in both collections
were first presented, respectively, at the first and second UCLA-University
of Warwick International Clinical Conference, a highly successful effort
devoted specifically to the development of clinical scholarship. These two
collections and the conference reflect the new stage at which we have
arrived in the relatively short, twenty-year history of clinical education.2
This relationship between the clinician and scholarly work product has
steadily matured. The purpose of this brief introduction is to comment on
that phenomenon.
Among legal educators there is no group more introspective than
clinicians. We examine the role we have assumed within academia. We
have lengthy debates on how we shall carry out our teaching
responsibilities. To many in and outside our ranks, teaching methodology
and clinical education are synonymous. A good deal of our energies are
aimed at assisting our students in developing their skills of self-reflection,
their ability to analyze critically what they do as lawyers. Among
ourselves, we continue these reciprocal critiques and self-critiques, often
to such an extent that to nonclinicians, it appears we are conducting an
exercise in collective masochism. But that is not the case. Rather, it is our
Director, Lawyering Skills Center, New York Law School.
1. See Symposium. ClinicalEducation, 34 UCLA L. REV. 577 (1987). While there have
been several compilations of articles on clinical education in the last twenty years, only this
New York Law School Law Review issue and the UCLA volume seem dedicated solely to
the dissemination of clinical scholarship. See Alfieri, Essay: The Politics of Clinical
Knowledge, 35 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REy. 7, 7 n.1 (1990) (listing various recent law review issues
dedicated to clinical education).
2. Another effort devoted to clinical scholarship is the Columbia Law School Clinical
Theory Workshop, begun several years ago by Professor Stephen Ellmann. During the
current academic year, six papers are being written for presentation at the Workshop.
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL L4W REVIEW
pedagogical commitment to producing a law graduate who will be a
better, wiser, more effective, efficient, and humane lawyer that impels us
to scrutinize our activities to the extent that we do.
3
That normative theme goes to the heart of one of our most heatedly
debated current subjects of self-reflection: Should clinicians produce
scholarship? From this threshold question flow other key concerns. If it
is found that they should, what kind of scholarship should it be and at
whose expense will it be produced? Will law students and the clients they
serve be shortchanged because clinicians have less time for clinical
supervision? 4 Will law schools facilitate clinical scholarly work by
appropriately recognizing the physical and emotional limits of clinicians?
These issues should be considered as you read and digest the papers in
this volume.
Most of our discussions of these questions have been defensive in
nature.' The tenor of the debates has been shaped by the circumstances
that instigated them. One question is, "Why don't or can't clinicians
publish?" The message asserted by the traditional academics is, "If
clinicians want tenure or comparable job security, they must write. If they
can't write, they are not our equals." If clinicians want a place in
academia, they simply have to write.6 I wish to change the tone of our
3. One of the exhilarating experiences for me in attending many gatherings of
clinicians over the years has been the opportunity to feel the genuine concern for the
student. It is universal and often eloquently expressed. It is what causes us to examine and
criticize what we do, what we say, what we teach, and as this issue shows, what we write.
See generally Alfieri, supra note 1.
4. See generally Elson, The Case Against Legal Scholarship or, If the Professor Must
Publish, Must the Profession Perish?, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 343 (1989) (The paramount duty
of law schools is to educate students to be competent practitioners. To the extent the
scholarly mission exhausts limited resources, it undermines that dominant responsibility.).
5. For the most part, these clinical debates have been informal and recorded principally
in the AALS Clinical Section Newsletter. See, eg., Hoffman, Message from the Chair, AALS
Sec. CLINICAL LEGAL EDU . NEmsL., March 1987, at 1, 2 (a hortatory call for scholarship
so that we will be judged as "equals"); Palm, Messagefrom the Chair, AALS Se. CLINICAL
LEGAL EDUC. NEVSL, Sept. 1986, at 1 (a very thoughtful discussion of such important issues
as: How will it be funded? What should it be? What effect will it have on the quality and
quantity of clinical teaching?); Simon, How to Be a Scholarly Clinician?, AALS Sec.
CLJNICAL LEGAL EDUC. NEWSL., March 1987, at 20 (a useful how-to-do-it guide); Strong,
Message from the Chair, AALS Se- CLINICAL LEGAL EDUC. NEWSL, March/April 1990, at
3 (a comment on the evolution of our oral tradition to a scholarly tradition). See also the
comments of Elliott Milstein, Kandis Scott, and Philip Schrag, in Panel Discussion, Clinical
Legal Education: Reflections on the Past Fifteen Years and Aspirations for the Future, 36 CATH.
U.L. Rev. 337, 360-64 (1987) (discussing the notion of traditional scholarship by clinicians);
and most especially, David Barnhizer's article in this collection. See Barnhizer, The University
Ideal and Clinical Legal Education, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. Rev. 87 (1990).
6. See Barnhizer, supra note 5, at text accompanying notes 121-46. Professor Barnhizer
presents a strongly worded critique of any clinician who even thinks about resisting the need
[Vol. 35
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discussion of the scholarship question. We are past the defensive stage
and now may consider these issues from a different and more positive
vantage point.
Much is unique about clinicians' perspective on the law, lawyering,
and learning how to be a lawyer. It is this uniqueness that some of the
recent clinical scholarship is beginning to illuminate. We should applaud
these scholarly pursuits (which I am doing here) and encourage them
(which most usefully must be done by our nonclinical law school
administrative and academic colleagues). Unlike the lawyers who do not
teach or have time to reflect, let alone write, or the nonclinical teachers
who do not do any lawyering, the clinician does or at least could do all
of these things. This is where our scholarly potential lies.
A few comments about two of the papers in this volume, the Hartwell
and Peters' articles, will help me make my point.7 These articles usefully
illustrate the naturalness of the process of creating clinical scholarship.
Both demonstrate vividly how such scholarship flows directly from live-
client clinical supervision. It is that process that best defines clinical
scholarship.
Steven Hartwell's article' is a clinician's multidimensional response to
an issue directly related to the concern for producing better and more
humane lawyers-namely, should a clinician try to influence the role that
morality plays in the life and practice of the lawyer. The question arose
directly from his supervision of a student in a live-client clinic. He
researched related philosophical and psychological materials, in particular,
Kohlberg's theory on moral development.9 After developing tentative
interdisciplinary theses about the relevance of this theory to lawyering, he
took the next clinical step: how to apply the thesis in his teaching. He
devised a pedagogical plan, based, not surprisingly, on experiential
learning, and then carried it out. Hartwell did not stop there, but instead
sought to measure empirically the impact of his pedagogy.10
and appropriateness of scholarship.
7. I should add that this is not the place to summarize or review all of the articles
in this issue. Tony Alfieri, in fact, does just that in his critical essay at the beginning of
this volume. See Alfieri, supra note 1. These brief observations, therefore, in no way suggest
a lesser importance or value in the other articles. To the contrary, each of these seven
articles, diverse though they are, makes a valuable contribution to clinical education. Rather,
my remarks are offered as a commentary on the process of creation of clinical scholarship.
8. Hartwell, Moral Developmen Ethical Conduc4 and Clinical Education, 35 N.Y.L.
SCH. L REv. 131 (1990).
9. Id. at 133.
10. Empirical research in the clinical context, under carefully designed conditions,
offers wide opportunities for scholarship. See, eg, Stark, Tegeler & Channels, The Effect
of Student Values on Lawyering Perfonnance: An Empirical Response to Professor Condlin,
37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 409 (1987).
1990]
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While not definitive in any statistical sense, the effort reflects a
clinician's sensitivity to the nexus between theory and practice. Hartwell's
paper exemplifies the innovative efforts of the modem clinician who
conceptualizes, implements, assesses empirically, and then analyzes. It is
clinical scholarship in the best sense of our new and developing tradition.
In a similar fashion, Don and Martha Peters take a relatively
straightforward proposition -that a lawyer who is more self-aware
probably can become a better interviewer -and subject it to a clinician's
analysis." Using the Myers-Briggs psychological type indicator as a vehicle
for their analysis, they posit their hypothesis about the interrelationship
of psychology and skills learning theory: test it through use, observation,
and study; and then analyze the results. Like Hartwell, their article
reflects both interdisciplinary and empirical work. In a fascinating manner,
they correlate the psychological dispositions of lawyers to two very
concrete facets of interviewing skills: the ability to ask properly formed
questions and the ability to listen. Doing something only clinicians usually
do-videotaping initial interviews of twenty-three actual matrimonial
clients (with their consent) -they transcribed the tapes and analyzed them.
Their data, while concededly very limited, is striking. Among other things,
it confirmed my own instincts and anecdotal observations. More
importantly, it suggests some discrete methods that clinicians might use
to teach interviewing.
Hartwell and the Peters personify the triple-threat clinician: the
clinical educator; the lawyer (who provides important services together
with clinical students to a needy client population); and the
researcher/scholar. It is only in the live-client clinical context that such a
multifaceted feat is achievable. Proceeding with sensitivity so as not to
intrude on the lawyering function, they. closely examined interviewing
interactions. Furthermore, they did so in an interdisciplinary and, in one
instance, a collaborative way that facilitated the compilation of empirical
data that supported both their theories and possible additional research.
A common denominator of both of these papers is the pursuit of ways to
improve the quality of our law graduates, which continues to be the goal
of clinical education generally.
Whatever were the numerous external factors that led clinicians in
prior periods to publish, clinical scholarship now has its own internal
force. It is evolving almost unrestrainedly, building on the openness and
innovative spirit that have characterized clinical education. This
scholarship moves forward on its own terms and for its own purposes. It
is that genuine quest for knowledge, coupled with the desire to explore
11. Peters & Peters, Maybe That's Why I Do That: Psychological Type Theory, The




hypotheses and test theories, that is reflected in much of the current
clinical scholarship. It is the same motivation that underlies traditional
scholarship. The resulting richness and diversity of clinical scholarship is
demonstrated in this volume.12
The question now is how can we maintain the development and
evolution of this clinical scholarly tradition, while preserving that which
is integral and valuable about clinical education -namely, the teacher
closely supervising the student on a live case and exploring that
experience fully and in ways that lecture or even simulation cannot
possibly replicate. The short answer is we must do both. While it will not
be easy, the difficulty should not deter us from making the effort.
Pluralism should be central to any response by either the clinical
movement or the legal academy. Some clinicians may want to do only
traditional doctrinal or theoretical analysis. At the other end are clinicians
who prefer to do only clinical supervision. The latter task is not only
integral to the continued lifeblood of clinical education, but it is also so
different from the teaching performed by the nonclinical law professor
(and one that most academics simply do not want to, or perhaps cannot,
provide), that a category for the pure clinical teacher ought to be
facilitated, encouraged, and certainly respected. Otherwise, it may be
impossible to provide anything that approaches an adequate level of
clinical opportunities. Similarly, the kinds of writing or scholarship we ask
12. These articles by no means exemplify all of the categories of our scholarship over
the last twenty years. But the coincidence of their compilation in one volume justifies, I
believe, my attempt to offer this more positive perspective on the status and definition of
clinical scholarship. Large categories of uniquely clinical scholarship that are not represented
in this issue include innovative course materials: see, eg., G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, THE
LAwYERING PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR CUNICAL INSMUCrON IN ADVOCACY (1978); M.
MELTSNER & P. SCHRAG, PuBuc INTERESr ADVOCACY: MATERIALS FOR CLINICAL LEGAL
EDUCATION (1974) (both classics in clinical education); videotapes: see, e.g, the ethics series
produced by the University of Pennsylvania Law School Center on Professionalism,
Professional Responsibility for Lawyers: A Guided Course (1990); papers with a feminist
focus: see, ag., Eyster, Integrating Non-Sexist/Racist Perspectives into Traditional Course and
Clinical Settings, 14 S. ILL. U.LJ. 471 (1990); articles integrating doctrinal and skills issues:
see, eg., Spiegel, Lawyers and ProfessionalAutonomy: Reflections on Corporate Lawyering and
the Doctrine of Informed Consent, 9 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 139 (1987); Grosberg, Class
Actions and Client-Centered Decisionmadng, 40 SYRAcusa L REV 709 (1989). Other loose
categories of scholarship that are reflected in this volume include pedagogical: eg., Binder,
Bergman & Price, Lawyers as Counselors: A Client-Centered Approach, 35 N.Y.L SCH. L.
REay. 29 (1990); theoretical: eg:, Barnhizer, supra note 5; Alfieri, supra note 1; empirical: eg.,
McDiarmid, What's Going on Down There in the Basement: In-House Clinics Expand Their
Beachhea4 35 N.Y.L ScH. L REv. 239 (1990) (an analysis of clinical education). Articles
like those by Peters & Peters, supra note 11; Hartwell, supra note 8; as well as Weinstein,
Teaching Mediation in Law Schools: TrainingLawyers to Be rse, 35 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 199
(1990), defy categorization, except of course to say that all three are uniquely clinical
scholarship.
1990]
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clinicians to produce should reflect the nature of clinical, not traditional,
legal education. In that respect, diversity, not conformity, should be the
operating norm.u The community of clinicians, and in turn the larger
world of legal educators, ought to be able to accommodate clinicians who
write, those who do not, and most importantly, those whose scholarly
production is as different in nature from other clinicians as it is from that
of traditional legal scholars.
The goal is not to make ourselves over in the image of our traditional
colleagues. We must do what we are uniquely qualified and genuinely
inclined to do, and we should proceed in our typically creative, free-
wheeling, and often self-critical manner, ideally free of the intellectual
and emotional constraints that may have blinded us temporarily during the
earlier stages of the clinical scholarship debate. By compiling this volume,
the editorial board of the New York Law School Law Review has
contributed importantly to the continued development of a clinical
scholarship tradition.
13. This is not the place to debate such questions as what kinds of work will count
as clinical scholarship for purposes of tenure or other forms of job security. A good start,
however, would be to include at least all of the categories just noted. See supra note 12.
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